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I review the role of probability in contemporary physics and the origin
of probabilistic time asymmetry, beginning with the pre-quantum case
(both stochastic mechanics and classical statistical mechanics) but con-
centrating on quantum theory. I argue that quantum mechanics radically
changes the pre-quantum situation and that the philosophical nature of
objective probability in physics, and of probabilistic asymmetry in time,
is dependent on the correct resolution of the quantum measurement prob-
lem.
1 Introduction
If there are objective probabilities — chances — anywhere in nature, physics
seems to be the place to look. Most obviously, quantum mechanics apparently
makes irreducible probabilistic claims about atomic transitions, the decay of
radioactive particles, and the like. More subtly, classical statistical physics
makes extensive use of probability distributions over classical microstates, and
these are sometimes claimed to be objective probabilities.1
This paper has two halves. In the first half (sections 2–6), I summarise
the way in which probability figures into generalised stochastic mechanics (that
is, the probabilistic generalisation of deterministic classical mechanics) and into
classical statistical mechanics; I discuss the philosophical interpretation of prob-
ability in both cases, and consider how the two concepts interact if both sorts
of probability are simultaneously in use. I also stress the fact that probabilis-
tic dynamics, under weak assumptions, imply a time asymmetry, and explore
what assumptions underpin this asymmetry. My impression is that these two
pre-quantum situations are the main situations considered by philosophers of
probability, and I hope that these sections of the paper provide some help con-
necting the philosophical discussion to the physics.
However, in the second half (sections 7–10) I consider how the discussion
is changed by quantum mechanics. I argue that the probabilistic assumptions
1In this volume, the chapters by Frisch, Handfield and Wilson, Schwarz, and Weslake
explicitly endorse this claim.
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of classical statistical mechanics are radically changed by quantum theory, that
the role of probability and the origin of probabilistic time asymmetry in quan-
tum theory is strongly dependent on one’s preferred resolution of the quantum
measurement problem, and that one resolution (the Everett interpretation, or
many-worlds theory) suggests an interpretation of objective probability that has
no classical analogue and that arguably improves on the pre-quantum situation.
I have tried to write this paper without requiring any acquaintance with con-
temporary physics or mathematics (beyond a rudimentary acquaintance with
complex numbers). As such, I require the reader to take on trust a significant
number of technical claims. For the most part I have not attempted to provide
detailed references for the claims I make when they rest on standard physics; in-
terested readers are referred to Wallace (2010b), Wallace (2013), and references
therein.
2 Classical mechanics
At its most abstract, the classical dynamics of 푁 point particles just consists
of a set of rules that determine, for each choice of the positions and velocities
of the particles, what the rates of change of those positions and velocities are.
By iteratively applying this rule, we can determine, for any initial choice of
positions and velocities, what the positions and velocities are at all future times.
Abstractly, the set of all possible positions and velocities is called the state space
of the theory: the dynamics determine, through each point in state space, a
unique trajectory for all future times starting at that point. And in fact, the
rule can readily be reversed, so that each point determines a unique trajectory
for all past times ending at that point. If we call the space of trajectories
through state space — that is, the space of functions from possible times into
state space — the history space of the 푁 -point-particle system, the role of the
dynamics is to select a unique history through each point.
We can usefully separate this idea of a history into future histories, which
start at a given point and continue forward forever, and past histories, which
end at a given point and continue backward forever. A history is then just an
ordered pair of one past and one future history.
Essentially all the dynamical theories of classical mechanics (whether they
describe the physics of point particles, or planets in motion, or rigid bodies in
rotation, or continuous fluids, or electric and magnetic fields, or . . . ) have this
structure: instantaneous states of a system are represented by points in some
state space, and possible histories of the system are represented by trajectories
in the state space. The dynamics selects, of all the trajectories through a given
point, exactly one which is dynamically allowed. Indeed, the framework is
abstract enough to apply to virtually any deterministic dynamical system, given
a sufficiently abstract concept of state space.2
2The state space of classical physics is traditionally called ‘phase space’, a term I avoid for
simplicity.
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Roughly speaking,3 we can think of this history space as a subset of the set
of all possible worlds, representing all of the worlds where there are (say) 푁
classical point particles and nothing else. The subset of dynamically allowed
histories then represents those possible worlds which are physically possible
given the particular sort of classical physics under consideration.
The degrees of freedom of a classical dynamical system are, roughly,4 the
number of distinct coordinates required to specify a point in state space. In the
case of 푁 particles, for instance, the system has 6푁 degrees of freedom: 3 posi-
tions, and 3 velocities, for each of the 푁 particles. When a classical dynamical
system has a great many degrees of freedom, describing its full dynamics can be
impossibly complicated (a macroscopically large object, under the fiction that
its atomic constituents are classical, can easily have 1027 degrees of freedom!)
In this situation, some kind of coarse-grained description is necessary, and a
useful example of such is the method of macrostates. Here, the state space is
partitioned into subsets (the ‘macrostates’), so that each point lies in exactly
one subset; in general, macrostates are chosen so that macroscopically similar
states lie in the same macrostate. If (mostly for convenience) we also consider
the system’s state only at a discrete number of times 푡1, . . . 푡푛, then a given
history of the dynamical system determines, for each time 푡푖, a macrostate of
the system at that time: that is, to every microscopic history is associated a
unique macro-history, a unique sequence of macrostates.
In some special cases, to know what macrostate a system has at time 푡푛+1,
we need to know only its macrostate at time 푡푛. For instance, if (for a system of
particles) macrostates are defined so that any two states with the same centre-
of-mass position and velocity lie in the same macrostate, then each macrostate
determines a unique macrohistory. In this case, we can say that the system
has autonomous macrodynamics. In general, though, to know a system’s fu-
ture macrohistory requires information about its full present state, not just
its present macrostate. In principle we can separate out the idea of a future-
autonomous macrodynamics from a past-autonomous macrodynamics: a system
has future-autonomous (resp. past-autonomous) macrodynamics if the current
macrostate uniquely determines all future (resp. all past) macrostates indepen-
dently of the current state. But in fact, since classical dynamics is past- and
future-deterministic, it isn’t possible to have one without the other.
Finally, classical dynamics generally possesses two important symmetries:
time translation and time reversal. Time translation symmetry means that
the dynamics do not depend explicitly on time: that is, the unique dynamical
trajectory through a point 푥 is the same whether we consider 푥 to be the state
3Only roughly, because (i) depending on one’s preferred account of possible worlds, the
history space may represent, and not simply be, a subset of the possible worlds; (ii) more
interestingly, points in state space are specified by positions and velocities, but at least on
standard accounts of velocity, the velocity of a particle over a finite period of time is logically
determined by the position of that particle over the same period of time. So only that subset
of trajectories in state space for which the time derivative of position equals velocity really
represent possible worlds.)
4‘Roughly’ because often in classical mechanics we treat a position and its conjugate mo-
mentum as, collectively, a single degree of freedom.
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of the system at one time or at another. In mathematical terms, if ℎ is the
unique history with ℎ(푡) = 푥, then the unique history ℎ′ with ℎ′(푡 + Δ푡) =
푥 is given by ℎ′(푡 + Δ푡) = ℎ(푡). Time reversal symmetry is a little harder
to define (see Albert (2000, ch.1) for a careful but very accessible discussion;
see also discussion by Arntzenius and Greaves (2009), Malament (2004), and
Earman (2002)) but roughly speaking, it requires that the dynamical system
has qualitatively the same structure in the past as in the future. Normally this
is imposed by stipulating some appropriate time reversal map 휏 of state space
to itself, so that if ℎ is the history through some state 푥, the history ℎ′ through
휏푥 is given by ℎ′(푡) = 휏ℎ(−푡). (A more precise definition will not be needed for
our purposes.)
3 The stochastic alternative
Instead of classical mechanics’ determinism, we can imagine a probabilistic me-
chanics where the current state only probabilistically determines future states:
a (future-)stochastic mechanics, to use the technical term. Whereas in a future-
deterministic system each given state determines a unique future history, in a
future-stochastic system each state 푥 determines a probability measure over fu-
ture histories starting at 푥. (That is, roughly speaking, it assigns a probability
to each future history starting at 푥: actually the matter is a little more subtle
as there will in general be continuum many such histories.) The concept of
indeterminism often popularly associated with quantum mechanics in cases like
radioactive decay fits the stochastic-dynamics model: if the decaying nucleus
has a mean lifetime of 휏 , then if 푥 is its state at time 0 then the history where it
decays at time 푡 gets probability e−푡/휏 . The concept of past-stochastic dynamics
is defined in the analogous way.
If we imagine discretising time, so that it makes sense to think of the state
that immediately follows a given state, we can think of future-stochastic dynam-
ics as specified by a system of transition probabilities: a given state 푥 determines
a transition probability 푃푇 (푦∣푥) for the next state being 푦 conditional on the
current state being 푥. (Again, there are subtleties due to the fact that 풮 is
typically continuous). In the continuous-time case this concept of transition
probabilities requires more work to make precise, but qualitatively the same
ideas apply; in any case, even in a continuous-time system we can still talk
about the transition probability for a system currently in state 푥 to be in state
푦 after some fixed time interval. In the case of the decaying nucleus as popularly
understood, for instance, for small times 훿푡 an undecayed state has transition
probability ≃ 훿푡/휏 into a decayed state and 1 − 훿푡/휏 into an undecayed state,
whereas a decayed state stays decayed with probability 1. (And again, for a
past-stochastic system we can define transition probabilities into the past in the
analogous way.)
Just as in the deterministic case, it makes sense to say that a given future-
stochastic system is invariant under time translation: this is to require that the
probability assigned by a state 푥 to each history beginning at 푥 is the same
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whatever the time at which the history starts. Equivalently, it is to require that
the transition probabilities do not depend on the time.
Importantly, while past- and future-determinism, and time translation in-
variance, coexist peacefully, in that one and the same system can (and, in
classical mechanics, usually does) have all three properties, past- and future-
stochasticism and time-translation invariance are incompatible. More precisely:
no future-stochastic system which satisfies time-translation invariance is also
describable as a time-translation-invariant past-stochastic system, except in the
trivial case where the dynamics is really past- and future-deterministic.
We can see why, informally, by considering the decaying nucleus once again.
Given a decayed nucleus, for all we know it may have been decayed for an
instant, an hour, or a million years). There is no relevant sense in which its
probability of having just decayed can be calculated from its present state alone
(given the dynamics we have stipulated for it). A more precise proof, and review
of the relevant literature, can be found in Uffink (2010).
A possible world whose physics are given by stochastic dynamics, then, has
a direction of time which is fundamental: that is, a direction that is built in
to the dynamics themselves. It does not depend on contingent details of the
matter distribution in that world.5
4 Classical statistical mechanics
Stochastic dynamics introduces the idea of probability into a physical theory at
the level of the fundamental laws, but there is another way in which probabilis-
tic ideas play a role in dynamics. To see this, we return to the deterministic
case: suppose we are considering some classical-mechanical system, and that at
some initial time 푡0 we specify, not a unique state of the classical system but a
probability distribution 휌(푡0) over such states; in mathematical terms, this is to
suppose that at 푡0 we specify not a point in the state space but a probability
measure over the state space. The interpretation of that probability measure
is a vexed question to which I will return but for the moment it may help to
conceptualise it simply as a measure of our ignorance of the actual state.
The mathematics of probability, combined with the deterministic dynam-
ics of the system, now determine a unique probability measure over histories:
since every point in state space determines a unique history through that point,
the probability that history ℎ obtains is just the probability assigned to the
state ℎ(푡0) which ℎ assigns to time 푡0. This in turn determines a probability
distribution over states at all other times: that is, we can determine a unique
probability distribution 휌(푡) over states at time 푡, given the original probability
distribution 휌(푡0). In fact, we can write down a dynamical evolution equation
for 휌(푡), which determines the rate of change of 휌(푡) as a function of 휌(푡). (In
classical mechanics, this equation is called the Liouville equation.) Formally,
5That is, it does not so depend if we take the laws as fixed, and put aside the possibility
of a Humean dependence of law on matter of fact. I return to this point later.
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this makes the evolution of the probability distribution into just another dy-
namical system, but where points in the ‘state space’ are to be understood as
probability distributions over physical states of affairs, not as physical states of
affairs themselves.
Just as (given a fixed choice of partition of state space into macrostates)
an individual dynamical history determines a unique macrohistory (that is: a
unique sequence of macrostates), so a probability distribution over histories
determines a unique probability distribution over macrohistories. Specifically,
the probability of a macrohistory is the total of the probabilities of all of the
histories compatible with it.
In the case previously considered, a system had future-autonomous macrody-
namics if a given macrostate determined a unique future macrohistory through
that state (independent of the actual state). The natural generalisation of this
to the statistical case would be to regard a system as having future-autonomous
(probabilistic) macrodynamics if a given macrostate determined a unique prob-
ability distribution over future macrohistories having that macrostate as their
initial history, independent of the actual probability distribution over states.
If this were the case, the macrodynamics would constitute a future-stochastic
dynamics on the space of macrostates. Since the underlying deterministic dy-
namics do not depend explicitly on time, that future-stochastic dynamics will
be time-translation-invariant. Past-autonomous probabilistic macrodynamics
could be defined in the same way.
However, dynamical autonomy in this strong sense is impossible (except in
the special case where we have dynamical autonomy in our previous sense, so
that all the probabilities are zero or one). The most straightforward way to see
this is to note that if the probability distribution is concentrated on a single
state (so that that state has probability one and all sets of states not includ-
ing it have probability zero) then the “probabilistic” macrodynamics collapse
back to being deterministic. A subtler reason is that given the time-reversal
symmetry of the underlying dynamics, if the system has future-autonomous
macrodynamics it also has past-autonomous macrodynamics. But this would
mean that we have a dynamics on the space of macrostates which can be de-
scribed both by a time-translation-invariant future-stochastic dynamics, and by
a time-translation-invariant past-stochastic dynamics; we have seen that this is
not possible.
However, there are very good (albeit somewhat non-rigorous) grounds to be-
lieve that for a certain very wide class of probability distributions (which could
be characterised as being all those which do not vary too chaotically and sharply
with respect to a certain baseline distribution, the Liouville measure) that the
macrodynamics generated by each of these distributions coincide (or very nearly
so) and determine a unique probability distribution over future histories for any
given macrostate at any time later than the time 푡0 at which the probability
distribution is defined. Following Wallace (2010b) and Wallace (2012a, ch.8) I
call this class of distributions Simple. If a system does have macrodynamics of
this kind, I say that it has almost-future-autonomous macrodynamics: almost
future-autonomous because the induced future-stochastic macrodynamics de-
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pend only on some very broad assumptions about the probability distribution,
and not on the details of the distribution modulo those assumptions.
Note that the time symmetry of the underlying dynamics means that the
time-reversed claim should hold: the macrodynamics determined over past his-
tories (that is, histories ending at time 푡0) should be almost-past-autonomous.
The reason that this is not contradictory is that the account given violates time
translation invariance: in general, distributions that are Simple at time 푡0 are
not transformed by the underlying dynamics into Simple distributions in either
the future or the past of 푡0. The future evolution of a Simple distribution at
a time 푡 > 푡0 has a very complicated microstructure which encodes the fact
that the system’s past evolution from 푡 to 푡0 is not correctly predicted by the
almost-past-autonomous macrodynamics that apply at times before 푡0.
How does this link to real physics? The answer is that the almost-future-
autonomous dynamics induced by various forms of deterministic microdynamics
turn out to be widely empirically realised in a variety of physical situations, such
as the cooling of large objects, or the diffusion of gas into a room, or the stochas-
tic movement of pollen grains (whereas the almost-past-autonomous dynamics
are never empirically realised at all). The empirical success of those dynam-
ics could then be explained (under the fiction that the true microdynamics of
the Universe is classical) by stipulating that the initial state of the system in
question — that is, of the Universe as a whole, if that is the system we wish
to study — is determined probabilistically using a Simple probability distribu-
tion (which specific distribution is of no further import as far as the dynamics
are concerned). We impose this probabilistic boundary condition at the begin-
ning of time (or at least, at the beginning of whatever period of time we can
empirically access) because this is the only way to rule out the time-reversed
macrodynamics that would otherwise occur to the past of whatever time we
choose to impose the boundary condition. This use of a probabilistic boundary
condition to explain the asymmetries of observed laws in the classical context is
discussed in this volume by Loewer and Albert, and also in, e. g. , Albert (2000);
for a more detailed version of my own account, see Wallace (2010b).6
For completeness — and to link my account more firmly to the philosophy
of statistical mechanics literature — I should note that in many cases, including
most of those where there are truly macroscopic numbers of degrees of freedom,
the induced stochastic macrodynamics is so overwhelmingly concentrated on
one macrohistory as to be deterministic to a very high degree of accuracy; in
this case, the indeterminism of the macrodynamics has a subtler character. In
this case also, we can divide the individual initial states in the first macrostate
of a given history into two categories: those that do, and those that do not, de-
terministically generate the overwhelmingly-most-probable macrohistory. The
latter states — call them the thermodynamically Anomalous states — must,
by construction, collectively receive overwhelmingly small probability according
6Albert’s condition is only partly probabilistic, and also includes a constraint on the initial
macrostate: the ‘Low Entropy Past Hypothesis’; in Wallace (2010b) I make the case that this
second condition is not needed, at least if the goal is to explain the asymmetry of the observed
macroscopic laws.
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to any Simple probability measure. The reader should resist the temptation,
though, to replace our probabilistic boundary condition with a categorical con-
dition that the initial state is not Anomalous: we have no non-probabilistic
characterisation of the Anomalous states, save the circular characterisation that
they do not lead to the desired macrohistory.
In any case, the crucial point is that stochastic dynamics that arise from
classical mechanics have a directedness that derives not from a fundamental
directedness in the dynamics, but from a probabilistically-stated boundary con-
dition. It might be reasonable to call this sort of directedness emergent, rather
than fundamental.
5 Interpreting probability in stochastic and sta-
tistical mechanics
My account so far has dealt with (fairly) uncontroversial physics. But the
obvious philosophical question to ask is: how are the probability measures to
be understood in either stochastic dynamics or statistical mechanics?
There are a great many ways of classifying various sorts of probability, but
for my purposes the following will be useful and (I hope) not too oversimplified.
A given sort of probability might be (here I basically follow Lewis (1980)):
Credence: A quantification of a rational agent’s degree of belief in a hypothesis
whose actual truth is unknown (whether the value of that degree of belief
is constrained only by the probability calculus, or by other principles of
rationality).
Analysed chance: An objective feature of the world, to be analysed in terms
of some kind of categorical or at least non-probabilistic feature of the
world.
Primitive chance: An objective feature of the world, irreducible to other fea-
tures.
In the case of stochastic dynamics, it seems difficult at best to understand the
probabilities as credences: the transition probability for radioactive decay, for
instance, at least seems to be a thoroughly objective feature of the world, to
be determined by measurement rather than rational cogitation. (Indeed, it was
precisely cases like this that motivated Lewis to argue that even subjectivists
about probability required a notion of objective chance.)
If the probabilities of stochastic dynamics are chances, could they be anal-
ysed chances? On the face of it, this looks rather difficult: mathematically, the
probabilities are represented as a measure over a set of possible histories of the
world, but only one element in that set is actual. And recovering this function
over all histories from that single history looks logically impossible.
However, the law of large numbers tells us that if a sufficiently large number
of independent probabilistic events occur, the relative frequency of any given
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outcome will with high probability be close to the actual probability of that
outcome. So for a sufficiently complicated stochastic system, it seems at least
plausible that the actual world will with very high probability have a pattern
of frequencies from which the probability distribution over all worlds can be
recovered.
This strategy of recovering probabilities from long-run relative frequencies
is the dominant proposed strategy for analysing chance. Probably its most
sophisticated form is the Humean ‘best systems analysis’ of laws proposed by
Lewis (1986, 1994) and developed by, e. g. , (Loewer 2002; Hoefer 2007), ac-
cording to which the laws of nature are those hopefully-unique descriptions of
the categorical physical world which draw the best balance between simplicity
and strength, and which (in particular) might resort to probabilistic language
to best explain the relative frequencies of outcomes, without identifying prob-
abilities with those relative frequencies. The task that must be overcome by
proponents of such a strategy has two parts:
1. The technical task : actually provide an algorithm to recover, from the
categorical facts about the world, the desired probability measure over all
worlds (more accurately, over all histories of the dynamical system).
2. The conceptual task : having accomplished the technical task, justify why
the recovered measure actually is chance, rather than just being having
the formal properties of a probability measure.
The technical task is relatively well defined, the conceptual task less so: just
what, if anything, is required to justify such an identification? But one ap-
parently clear aspect of the task is to establish the links between chance and
rational inference and decision-making. In particular, we want to understand
why it is rational to regard short-run relative frequencies as providing informa-
tion about chance and why it is rational to regard information about chances
as relevant to our actions. Papineau (1996) calls these two links the Inferential
and Decision-Theoretic links, respectively; they can also be analysed, following
Lewis (1980), as aspects of a general link between credence and chance: the
‘Principal Principle.7
It lies beyond the scope of this paper to review progress at either task, but it
is, I think, fair to say that neither has been completed to anything like general
satisfaction, and that there is widespread scepticism as to whether either could
be completed. In this context the possibility of taking stochastic probabilities
to be primitive chances (and so accomplishing both tasks by postulate) starts to
look attractive; Russell’s oft-quoted line about the virtues of theft over honest
toil does come to mind, though.
What of the probabilities of statistical mechanics? Here there is a consid-
erable tradition (in physics, associated most often with E.Jaynes8 and often
found in textbooks) to regard the probability measure over states as somehow
a measure of ignorance. This strategy can appear attractive at first sight in
7See also Schwarz, this volume.
8See, e. g. , Jaynes (1957a, 1957b).
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part because objective chances seem less obviously appropriate for a determin-
istic universe and in part because the probability measures used in statistical
mechanics tend to have a very simple, natural form and so look as if some kind
of a priori principle might be used to justify them. (I set aside another family
of reasons — based on alleged deep connections between statistical mechanics
and information theory — for reasons of space.)
There is room to be sceptical of such principles in probability on their own
terms: in particular, they tend to rely on the ‘principle of indifference’, which
has a dubious philosophical status and which anyway is not easy to apply to a
theory where a system might be in continuum many states. But more funda-
mentally, the probability distribution in statistical mechanics grounds objective
features of the world. The emergent almost-autonomous stochastic macrody-
namics discussed in the previous section have a definite directedness in time —
their transition probabilities are future-directed, not past-directed — and that
directedness is a direct consequence of the imposition of a Simple probability
distribution at the start of the universe rather than its end. If the final prob-
ability distribution were Simple, the stochastic macrodynamics would play out
in the reverse direction; if neither past nor future probability distribution were
Simple, there would be no autonomous macrodynamics at all. The same applies
to the thermodynamic aspects of irreversibility: phenomena like the melting of
ice or the diffusion of gas have a clear time direction which can be tracked back
(at least in part) to the probabilistic boundary conditions. If those boundary
conditions are simply a matter of credences, it is difficult to see what objective
facts about the world are supposed to ground its objective dynamical asymme-
tries in time. (See Albert (2000, ch.3) for further, acerbic, remarks along these
lines.)
This might suggest that statistical-mechanical probabilities ought to be un-
derstood as chances, just as for stochastic probabilities — even though the
actual dynamics is always deterministic. One way to visualise this proposal is
to think of the dynamics of the theory as containing one single stochastic event,
happening at the initial time, which sets the initial conditions. Such a theory
sounds rather awkward but could plausibly be understood within the Humean
best-systems analysis described earlier (that description of the initial condition
which best combines simplicity and strength might be a probabilistic condition)
or simply taken as a brute postulate.
However, there is a more important disanalogy between the two cases. The
probabilities of stochastic dynamics are directly empirically accessible. The
only empirical consequence of the initial probability distribution appears to be
that the almost-autonomous stochastic macrodynamics are realised — and those
macrodynamics take the same form whatever the initial probability distribution
is, provided only that it is Simple. Virtually all the specifics of that distribution
are empirically inaccessible. If the initial condition is an objective probability
claim, then, it is heavily underdetermined by the empirical data.
It is therefore tempting to look for some way to characterise the initial
probability distribution that is less specific. One proposal (advocated by, e. g. ,
Goldstein (2001) and Lebowitz (2007); see also Frigg (2009) and references
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therein) tries to replace the quantitative concept of probability with a qualita-
tive version: “typicality”. Such proposals (which remain under development)
trade on the previous section’s observation that in the case of thermodynamic
processes, the Anomalous states whose future time evolution does not generate
the overwhelmingly-most-probable future history have very low probability ac-
cording to any Simple probability measure. If these states can be characterised
somehow as wildly atypical, so that it is reasonable to assume that the initial
state is not one of them, then no explicit probability measure is required. (The
generalisation to macrodynamical processes that are stochastic is not so clear
but presumably appeals to the relative frequency of different outcomes when
such processes occur many times.)
However, we have now come full circle, as any suggestion that the typicality
of the initial state can be assumed on grounds of general a priori reasonable-
ness runs into the objection that the final state is highly atypical, and that the
typicality assumption on the initial state plays an essential role in guaranteeing
the accuracy of the observed macrodynamics and grounding their time asym-
metry. The only way out of this impasse, so far as I can see, is to abandon any
hope of grounding the asymmetry of our experience of time in physical facts
and instead justify the imposition of the typicality assumption at early times by
appeal to some more metaphysically fundamental asymmetry of time; Maudlin
(2007, ch.4) has recently made such a proposal, for instance. Of course, this is
grist to the mill of those (such as Maudlin) who have independent metaphysical
reasons to think that the directedness of time is not simply grounded in con-
tingent physical fact; conversely, those (such as the author) who are suspicious
of any metaphysically primitive notion of a direction of time not grounded are
likely to be unhappy with this strategy.
6 Combining statistical mechanics with stochas-
tic dynamics
I have now discussed two separate strategies by which deterministic classical
microphysics can be generalised to include probabilities: either by introducing
stochastic dynamics, or by going from ordinary mechanics to statistical mechan-
ics. But the two can be combined: nothing prevents us from beginning with
a stochastic microdynamics and considering a probability distribution over the
initial conditions for that microdynamics.
Prima facie, this suggests that a stochastic statistical mechanics could have
two different, independent mechanisms to determine a direction of time: one at
the fundamental level, imposed by the direction of the stochastic dynamics, and
one at the emergent level, imposed by the imposition of a Simple probabilistic
boundary condition at one or other end of time. Indeed, we seem to confront
the heady possibility that these mechanisms, being independent, could point in
opposite directions!
We should be suspicious of such suggestions, however. Consider, in particu-
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lar, a dynamical theory where the dynamics is deterministic but interrupted by
occasional stochastic fluctuations. For instance (here I borrow an example from
Albert (2000)) we could supplement the classical mechanics of macroscopically
many point particles by adding a stochastic rule which periodically causes the
particles to jump small, random distances.9 If the collapse mechanism is appro-
priately structured (if, to be technical, it is reasonably smooth with respect to
the Liouville measure) then this additional random noise will have the effect of
smoothing out small-scale variations in a given classical probability distribution.
This will tend to cause an arbitrary distribution to tend towards a Simple one.
Or, in terms of the thermodynamically Anomalous states, it is highly unlikely
that a non-Anomalous state will jump to an Anomalous state, but highly likely
that an Anomalous state will jump to a non-Anomalous state. (Again, this does
not follow a priori for arbitrary choices of collapse rule, but is likely to do so for
physically reasonable ones.)
This has a highly desirable consequence (stressed by Albert): in the pres-
ence of this stochastic noise, the need for the probabilistic boundary condition
goes away, and the existence of almost-autonomous stochastic macrodynamics
follows from the existence of stochastic microdynamics. Issues of making sense
of the probabilistic initial condition simply go away, and the emergent arrow of
time in statistical physics is derived from a fundamental arrow of time in the un-
derlying dynamics. Of course, the problem of making sense of the probabilities
of stochastic physics would still remain.
(I make one remark in passing. On this hybrid account, the probabilities of
statistical mechanics become just as objective as the probabilities of stochastic
dynamics. This calls into question a widespread view in the philosophy of
statistical mechanics (stressed by, for instance, Goldstein (2001) and Albert
(2000, ch.3)) that physicists are mistaken to associate the thermodynamic state
of a system with a probability distribution. The main argument made for this
view is that the thermodynamic properties of a system are objective, and so
cannot depend on an agent’s knowledge of that system. Just so; but if the
probability distributions of statistical mechanics are themselves objective, this
is no obstacle to taking those distributions seriously as representatives of a
system’s thermodynamic state. I pursue this argument no further, however, as
in my view it is largely obviated by quantum theory, for reasons I expand upon
in section 9.)
7 Quantum theory
According to one popular conception of quantum theory, it does indeed consist
precisely of classical physics supplemented by small random jumps.10 If so,
9Albert officially has in mind a quantum theory — the “GRW dynamical collapse theory”,
of which more later, but this really serves as motivation for his example, which formally takes
place in the classical regime of point particles.
10I once heard it pointed out that a ‘quantum leap’, much beloved of advertising copywriters,
is a leap by the smallest possible amount and in a random direction.
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we would have a rather elegant resolution of at least some of the conceptual
problems of statistical mechanics, and a unification of the quantum-mechanical
arrow of time (induced by the random-jump rule) with the statistical-mechanical
arrow of time. However, the popular conception of quantum theory is badly off
the mark, and the real situation will turn out to be much more subtle.
What does quantum theory actually look like as a dynamical system? At
first sight, rather like a classical dynamical system: it has a state space (the
space of rays in Hilbert space, to be precise11), and a dynamical equation (the
Schro¨dinger equation) which associates a unique trajectory to each state. But
things are more complicated than this suggests, because quantum states have
a highly suggestive structure. Specifically, the quantum state space is linear : if
휓퐴 and 휓퐵 are possible states of a system, so is 훼휓퐴 +훽휓퐵 , where 훼 and 훽 are
arbitrary complex numbers satisfying ∣훼∣2 + ∣훽∣2 = 1. In the jargon, the new
state is a superposition of 휓퐴 and 휓퐵 , and 훼 and 훽 are the amplitudes of states
휓퐴 and 휓퐵 , respectively, in this superposition.
Linearity per se is not a particularly mysterious feature of a state space:
the state space of classical electromagnetic theory is linear.12 But in quantum
theory, certain states seem to describe systems with definite values of some par-
ticular quantity (position, say, or angular momentum), so that superpositions
of those states seem to have indefinite values of that quantity — and it is not
clear what this means. Furthermore, the dynamics of the Schro¨dinger equa-
tion dictate that this indefiniteness can infect the macroscopic realm. To use
Schro¨dinger’s infamous example, if we prepare a particle in a superposition of
position 퐴 and position 퐵, and then we set up a device which measures where
the particle is and kills some harmless cat if the result is ‘A’, then the dynamics
of quantum theory predict that after the device operates the cat will have a
state that is a superposition of alive and dead.
Since cats, and macroscopic objects more generally, do not appear to be
in indefinite states, this raises the question of how quantum theory can be so
empirically successful. The answer is that when we actually use the theory to
make predictions, at the end of the process we apply a rule — the Born rule —
to translate the state into probabilistic predictions. To illustrate by example,
if a system’s state is such that it has amplitude 훼 of being in position 푋, the
Born rule states that the measurement has a probability ∣훼∣2 of giving result 푋.
In the case of the cat, the rule likewise translates the amplitudes for the cat to
be alive or dead into probabilities.
This suggests that amplitudes are in some ill-defined sense ‘like’ probabili-
ties. Indeed, it is tempting (and a number of physicists have succumbed to the
temptation) to interpret quantum states in general as probability distributions
rather than as physical states (recall that in section 4 I noted that the dynamics
of probability distributions over a classical state space can itself be regarded
11This is a simplification: as I argue in Wallace (2012a, ch.8) and Wallace (2012c), the state
space of quantum theory ought really to be taken to be the space of mixed states.
12The linearity in question involves real rather than complex numbers — but ‘real’ numbers
are not less abstract than complex numbers, and in fact there are natural formulations of
electromagnetism that use complex numbers.
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as a deterministic dynamical system). According to this seductive idea, to say
that a cat is in a superposition of alive or dead is not to say anything mystical
about it being in an indefinite state of alive-ness, but simply and prosaically to
say that it has some probability of being alive and some of being dead.
The lures of this idea must be resisted; at least in this straightforward sense,
it is unworkable. At base, the reason is the quantum-mechanical phenomenon
of interference: quantum amplitudes, unlike probabilities, can cancel out or
reinforce one another, instead of simply adding up. To take a stylised example,
a particle currently at position 푋 might have amplitude +1/
√
2 to be at position
푊 in five seconds’ time, and the same amplitude to be at position 푍; the same
particle currently at position 푌 might have amplitude +1/
√
2 to go to 푍 and
−1/√2 to go to Z. According to the Born rule, whether the particle is at 푋
or at 푌 , it will have probability 1/2 to be found at 푍 in five seconds’ time,
and the same probability to be found at 푊 . So if the quantum state is simply
probabilistic, any superposition of 푋 and 푌 likewise is equally likely to move to
푍 as to 푊 .
But — because the Schro¨dinger equation preserves the linear structure of
the state space — if the particle initially has amplitude 1/
√
2 to be at 푋 and the
same amplitude to be at 푌 , its amplitude to go to 푍 is just the weighted sums
of the 푋 → 푍 and 푌 → 푍 amplitudes: that is, (1/√2)(1/√2 + 1√2) — which




2 − 1√2) = 0. This
cannot be explained on a straightforwardly probabilistic reading of quantum
states.
There are more sophisticated ways to understand the difficulty with a prob-
abilistic reading, and to rule out subtler variants (ranging from the classic
Kochen-Specker theorem (Kochen and Specker 1967)) to the recent, celebrated
result of Pusey, Barrett, and Rudolph (2011)) but ultimately they turn on the
same feature of quantum dynamics: interference rules out a probabilistic inter-
pretation of the amplitudes. Essentially the only way around this problem is
to abandon any attempt at a realist understanding of quantum theory and fall
back on the idea that the theory is simply a black-box device to make empirical
predictions; I will ignore such instrumentalism for the purposes of this paper.
To summarise: the quantum states of systems cannot in general be under-
stood probabilistically because of interference phenomena, but the measurement
rules of quantum theory seem to require that we understand the state probabilis-
tically when it comes to macroscopic phenomena like measurement processes or
cats. In other words, the quantum state seems to be neither physical nor prob-
abilistic but an inconsistent mixture of the two, with physicists interpreting it
one way or the other according to the particular situation. This is one way13 to
state the infamous quantum measurement problem.
Notwithstanding the conceptual severity of the measurement problem, as
a practical matter there is now little difficulty in knowing when to treat the
quantum state as physical and when to treat it as probabilistic. It is widely
13It is an admittedly somewhat heterodox way; I defend it more extensively, and more
technically, in Wallace (2011).
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accepted that the dynamics of the Schro¨dinger equation are such that interfer-
ence effects become negligibly small when superpositions become macroscopic in
scale. (Quantifying this is the subject matter of so-called ‘decoherence theory’;
see Schlosshauer (2007) for details, and Zurek (1991) for a somewhat less tech-
nical introduction.) In this situation, there is no inconsistency in applying the
probabilistic reading of the quantum state. Put in terms of my previous discus-
sion, quantum theory defines, to very good approximation, a future-stochastic
macrodynamics. As in the classical case, the macrostates are not precisely de-
fined (though the form of the stochastic macrodynamics is again fairly robust
against variations in the method of definition); unlike the classical case, the
macrostates cannot be identified with subsets of individual states (because the
states, in this regime, are being interpreted as probability distributions over
macrostates). (The formal machinery to realise this macrodynamics, and to
determine when it is consistently defined, is known as consistent histories or
decoherent histories, and is part of decoherence theory; see Hartle (2010) or
Halliwell (2010) for conceptually-motivated introduction, and Wallace (2012a,
ch.3) for philosophical discussion.)
8 Resolving the measurement problem
In one sense, the macrodynamics defined by quantum theory makes quantum
physics rather like classical statistical mechanics: in both cases, there is an
underlying dynamics which is deterministic, but under certain assumptions we
can define from that underlying dynamics a macrodynamics which is stochastic.
But in another sense, the two situations are very disanalogous. In the classical
case there is no mystery about the ontology of the theory and the relation
between micro and macro: we get from one to another by moving from individual
states to probability distributions over states, and the stochastic nature of the
macrodynamics is inherited from the probability measure of the initial state.
In the quantum case the move is instead made by simply treating the quantum
state as a probability measure in that (decoherence-defined) regime where it
is mathematically consistent to do so. Given that the quantum state cannot
consistently be understood as a probability measure in all cases, the conceptual
paradox remains, for all the practical utility of decoherence theory.
There are broadly three strategies for resolving that paradox, at least if we
want to hold on to the idea that physical theories ought to be descriptions of
the world and not instrumentalist toolkits. Two are modificatory strategies:
they involve changing quantum physics in order to produce a more conceptually
satisfactory theory. The third is purely interpretative: it leaves the mathemat-
ical structure of quantum physics intact and attempts to resolve its conceptual
difficulties. All three (for the most part14) have in common a commitment to
14I add this qualification for two reasons. Firstly, some advocates of hidden-variable theo-
ries (see, e. g. , Goldstein and Teufel (2000)) have speculated that in a future quantum-gravity
hidden-variable theory, the quantum state could be understood as time-independent and non-
contingent, and could then be understood more as a physical law than a physical state. Sec-
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the quantum state as being in some sense a physical state, representing physical
properties of the world and not just human ignorance of those properties.
The first modificatory strategy — dynamical collapse — introduces an ex-
plicit, stochastic modification to the Schro¨dinger equation, so that the deter-
ministic evolution of the quantum state is punctuated by stochastic transitions.
The intended effect of these transitions is to ensure that in situations where the
Schro¨dinger equation predicts a superposition of macroscopically definite states,
with some macrostate 푋 having amplitude 훼푋 , the new dynamics predicts in-
stead that the state will be in one of those macroscopically definite states, with
probability ∣훼푋 ∣2 of being in state 푋. A dynamical collapse theory, then, trans-
forms the merely formally forward-stochastic dynamics given by decoherence
theory (which, recall, metaphysically remains a deterministic theory) into an
actually forward-stochastic dynamics.
The second strategy — hidden variables — leaves the Schro¨dinger equation
intact but expands the concept of state, so that the physical state of the system
is given not just by the quantum state but by the quantum state together with
a state in some additional state space of ‘hidden variables’ (in many versions
of this strategy, the hidden-variable space is taken to the space of positions of
individual particles). In one sense, the term ‘hidden’ is a misnomer, because the
intention of the theory is that macroscopic facts supervene on facts about the
hidden-variable part of the state, not the quantum state.15 The hidden vari-
ables have their own dynamics, which may be deterministic or stochastic (but is
normally taken to be deterministic) and which causes the future evolution of the
hidden-variable state to depend on both the current hidden-variable state and
on the quantum state. In turn, by postulating a probability distribution over
the hidden variables (though not over the quantum state) at some initial time,
a statistical mechanics for the system as a whole is determined. The intention
is that all this construction is done in such a way as to produce, in the hidden-
variable part of the state space, an image of the formally stochastic quantum
macrodynamics that is actually forward-stochastic (either at the fundamental
level, as a consequence of fundamental stocasticity in the hidden-variable dy-
namics; or at the effective level, as a result of an appropriately-chosen initial
probability distribution over the hidden variables).16 This will be guaranteed if
(i) the quantum macrostates can be characterised in terms of some dynamical
variable (such as position); (ii) the hidden variables can be taken to represent
the actual value of that variable; (iii) the dynamics, and the hidden variable
initial probability, can be chosen to ensure that the probability of the hidden
variables having some value is equal to the probability given for that value by
ondly, there is a research program in foundations of quantum theory (see, e. g. , Harrigan and
Spekkens (2010) and Spekkens (2007)) that tries to eliminate the quantum state entirely from
hidden-variable theories. For reasons of space I omit further discussion of these approaches.
15It can be questioned whether this intention can in fact be delivered; see Brown and Wallace
(2005) for criticism, and Lewis (2007a) and Valentini (2010) for defence (see also Brown (2010)
for a reply to Valentini).
16I should acknowledge that this way of setting up the idea of a hidden-variable theory is
somewhat heterodox: for reasons that are not fully clear to me, the hidden-variable community
seems to make little use of the machinery of decoherence theory.
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the Born rule.
Both dynamical collapse theories and hidden-variable theories have been con-
structed for the case of nonrelativistic particle mechanics. (The classic examples
are the GRWP dynamical-collapse theory, named for Ghirardi, Rimini, Weber,
and Pearle, and the de-Broglie-Bohm hidden-variable theory; for reviews, see
Bassi and Ghirardi (2003) and Cushing, Fine, and Goldstein (1996), respec-
tively.) At present there is no generally accepted way to extend either strategy
to the regime of interacting relativistic particles and fields (which is necessary to
incorporate, for instance, the results of quantum electrodynamics and particle
physics).17 For this reason, while both strategies are popular among philoso-
phers of physics they have received relatively little attention within physics
proper.
The main interpretative strategy (given a commitment to realism) is the
Everett interpretation, which takes the quantum state to be a directly physical
state and does not modify or supplement the dynamics. Since the Schro¨dinger
equation predicts the creation of macroscopic superpositions, the Everett in-
terpretation has to take seriously the idea that macroscopic superpositions are
possible states of the universe. Given that at the macroscopic level superpo-
sitions do not interfere — that is, they branch off from one another but do
not recombine — this means that according to the Everett interpretation, at
the macroscopic level physical reality has the structure of many constantly-
branching approximately-classical states of affairs, co-existing but not inter-
acting with one another. This motivates the alternative name for the Everett
interpretation — the ‘many-worlds theory’— but it is important to understand
the existence of these worlds is not intended as an additional physical postu-
late but is supposed to follow from the structure and dynamics of unmodified
quantum theory. For an introduction to the Everett interpretation, see Wallace
(2012b); for a more detailed account see Wallace (2012a); a variety of views pro
and con can be found in Saunders, Barrett, Kent, and Wallace (2010).
The Everett interpretation has the major technical advantage of being appli-
cable to all known quantum theories, not just to the relatively restricted regime
of nonrelativistic particle physics; I think it is largely for this reason that it is sig-
nificantly the most popular of my three strategies among physicists (which is not
to say that it is the most popular solution to the measurement problem overall:
at least as many physicists are attracted by various more-or-less-operationalist
strategies, and of course the great majority adopt the so-called ‘shut up and cal-
culate interpretation’ !). It is, however, generally regarded amongst philosophers
as being more conceptually problematic than the hidden-variable or dynamical-
collapse strategies. The main philosophical concerns raised are (i) what justifies
regarding the quantum state as really (albeit emergently) representing multi-
ple branching worlds, and (ii) how probability is to be understood in a situ-
17This is not to say that there has been no progress on this front. The nearest thing to
a dynamical-collapse theory in the relativistic regime is Tumulka’s theory (Tumulka 2006),
which applies in the case where there are no interactions; relativistic hidden-variable theories
have been proposed by Durr et al (2004, 2005), Struyve and Westman (2007), and Colin and
Struyve (2007).
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ation where all possible outcomes of a quantum measurement are physically
realised. The former lies largely beyond the scope of this paper; in my own
view, it is unproblematic once we commit to a broadly functionalist account of
the relation between higher-order ontology and the underlying micro-ontology,
according to which the ‘worlds’ are higher-level structures instantiated in the
microphysics. I expand upon this in Wallace (2003, 2010a) and (Wallace 2012a,
ch.2); see Maudlin (2010) and Hawthorne (2010) for dissenting views (and La-
dyman (2010) for a reply to Hawthorne). The latter is best considered (for the
purposes of this paper) in the wider context of probability in quantum mechan-
ics, and is the topic of the section 10; before that, though, I need to consider
the statistical-mechanics version of quantum theory.
9 Quantum statistical mechanics and the arrow
of time in quantum theory
In section 7, I claimed that quantum theory leads (at least formally) to a
forward-stochastic macrodynamics, due to the operation of decoherence the-
ory. The observant reader will recall that in section 3 I claimed that no non-
trivial stochastic process can be simultaneously forwards-stochastic, backwards-
stochastic, and time-translation-invariant, so (given time-translation invariance)
that stochastic process must be time-asymmetric. This leads to a conceptual
problem over and above the quantum measurement problem: where does this
time asymmetry come from, given that it is not manifest in the (forwards- and
backwards-)deterministic Schro¨dinger equation?
Almost as a matter of logic, the answer must lie in the initial conditions,
and indeed it does. The derivations of emergent forward-stochastic physics
that occur in decoherence theory rely on certain assumptions about the initial
quantum state: it is assumed not to have too delicate a structure of phases
and magnitudes. The nature of this boundary condition is very similar from a
mathematical point of view to the Simple condition imposed in classical statis-
tical mechanics upon probabilistic initial conditions, and so again (and again
following Wallace 2010b) I call states Simple if they satisfy these assumptions;
however, from a conceptual point of view the assumption has a very different
character, as it is a constraint not on any probability distribution over initial
states but on the actual initial state.
In any case, the direction of time present in (unmodified) quantum mechanics
is emergent, just as in classical statistical mechanics: it arises as a consequence
of certain boundary conditions.
These structural analogies between quantum mechanics and classical sta-
tistical mechanics ought to cause us to be cautious in any assumption that
quantum statistical mechanics can be understood by analogy with classical sta-
tistical mechanics. Recall that in classical mechanics, we obtain a statistical
mechanics from an underlying deterministic dynamics by placing a probability
measure over initial conditions; if that probability measure is Simple, we obtain
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a macrodynamics (for later times than the initial condition) that is effectively
forward-stochastic and autonomous from the microscopic details. It might seem
that the same move is available in quantum theory: by placing a probability
measure over deterministically-evolving quantum states, we might expect to
obtain a quantum statistical mechanics, and to find emergent stochasticity by
constraining that probability distribution to be Simple.
However, we have seen that we obtain emergent stochasticity in quantum
theory simply by imposing a non-probabilistic boundary condition on the initial
state of a quantum system, if it has macroscopically many degrees of freedom.
The imposition of a further probabilistic boundary condition does not seem to
give rise to anything qualitatively new, and in fact it is far from clear that
it does any quantitative work in the quantum theory of macroscopic systems
either. (Certainly, I am not aware of any quantum-mechanical derivation of
emergent irreversibility or stochasticity which relies on any such assumption.18)
The point can be put directly as follows. In classical mechanics, we can con-
sider the dynamics of individual systems or of probability distributions over such
systems; we can also consider the dynamics of systems with a small number of
degrees of freedom, or with macroscopically many degrees of freedom. The dy-
namics of systems with macroscopically-many degrees of freedom is not classical
statistical mechanics: we obtain the conceptual novelties of statistical mechanics
only by going from individual states to probability measures over states (albeit
we may be able to finesse this move via considerations of typicality or the like)
and then imposing certain boundary conditions on those distributions. In quan-
tum mechanics, by contrast, the discipline of quantum statistical mechanics is
obtained simply from applying ordinary quantum mechanics to systems with
very many degrees of freedom and then imposing certain boundary conditions
on individual quantum states.
From a conceptual point of view, this should perhaps not be surprising. I
stressed in section 7 that quantum states behave like probability distributions in
the macroscopic regime. This suggests that we should think of the classical limit
of quantum mechanics as already being classical statistical mechanics (a point
that has been stressed by Ballentine (1970, 1990)). If so, the success of classical
statistical mechanics gives us no particular reason to make the statistical move
in the quantum case.
Indeed, the reverse is true. Insofar as classical mechanics is of interest to us
only because it is a good approximation to quantum mechanics in certain sit-
uations, the probability distributions in classical statistical mechanics arguably
should be understood as classical limits of individual quantum states, not as
probability distributions at all19 (except to the degree that individual quantum
18It is true that many such derivations make use of the machinery of mixed states (aka
density operators) and that mixed states do have an interpretation as probabilistic mixtures
of pure states. However: (i) in those cases of which I am aware, nothing essential (as opposed
to calculational) seems to change if the system’s state is instead treated as pure; (ii) it is far
from clear that the probabilistic interpretation is correct, given that mixed states also have an
interpretation as possible states of individual systems in (at least) those circumstances where
the system is entangled with other systems. I expand upon this point in Wallace (2012c).
19It is interesting to note that the main formalism used in physics to study semiclassical
19
states should be so understood). If so, the conceptual problems of probability
in classical statistical mechanics which vexed us in section 5 dissolve entirely:
they are artefacts of classical physics, with at most historical significance. There
remains a need for a constraint on initial conditions to deliver stochasticity at
the macro level, and this constraint may be philosphically problematic,20 but it
need not be understood as a probabilistic constraint.
10 Probability in quantum theory and its alter-
natives
If quantum theory dissolves the probabilistic puzzles of classical statistical me-
chanics, still it generates its own puzzles, which differ across the three strate-
gies to solve the measurement problem (dynamical collapse, hidden variables,
Everett) which I reviewed in section 8. The situation is cleanest in dynamical-
collapse theories, which are straightforwardly stochastic theories in the sense of
section 3: the discussion of stochastic chance in section 5 applies directly. The
state space of the theory is the state space of quantum theory; the dynamics
is specified by means of a rule mapping states to probability distribution over
future histories in that state space; the actual world consists of just one history
in state space; if probability is to be analysed in terms of some non-probabilistic
fact, the only candidate appears to be something like relative frequencies within
that history; formally defining a probability from information about these rela-
tive frequencies is not trivial; even if it could be defined, it is not clear on what
grounds it would count as being probability, and in particular, why it should
conform to the role played by chance in our inferential and decision-theoretic
activities. On the other hand, the stochastic dynamics probably suffices to re-
move any residual mystery about the condition of Simplicity on initial quantum
states required for the derivation of forward-stochasticity at the macro level:
it seems plausible (although I am not aware of technical results) that for any
reasonable dynamical-collapse rule, the argument of section 6 would go through
mutatis mutandis and remove the need for such a condition. (Indeed, dynam-
ical collapse theories are precisely the inspiration for Albert’s consideration of
stochastic jumps in classical mechanics, as discussed in that section.) The tem-
poral asymmetry in a dynamical-collapse theory would then be a consequence
of an asymmetry in the dynamics, and would be independent of any detailed
constraints on the initial state.
In a deterministic hidden variable theory such as the de Broglie-Bohm the-
ory, the quantum probabilities arise from a probabilistic constraint on the initial
values of the hidden variables; indeed, the constraint is much sharper than in
classical statistical mechanics, with the choice of probability distribution being
entirely specified by the quantum state if the predictions of quantum theory are
quantum theory — the Wigner function formalism — identifies quantum states with functions
on phase space which approximate classical probability distributions obeying the Liouville
equation under appropriate circumstances. (I elaborate on this point in Wallace (2012c)).
20For contrasting views on this subject, see (Callender 2004) and (Price 2004).
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to be recovered.21 This constraint seems to have the same nature — and the
same conceptual difficulties — as occur in classical statistical mechanics, and
as discussed in section 5. Indeed, probability in the de Broglie-Bohm theory is
often22 introduced to students by analogy with classical statistical mechanics.
However, in section 9 I claimed that there is no need for statistical probability
in quantum statistical mechanics, and hence no need for it in classical statistical
mechanics understood as a classical limit of quantum statistical mechanics. If
this correct, probability in deterministic hidden variable theories is sui generis:
it may or may not make sense, but it cannot be assumed to make sense just based
on the empirical successes of the methods of classical statistical mechanics.
Having said this, hidden-variable theories need not be deterministic, and
even some attempts to construct relativistic versions of the de Broglie-Bohm
theory do so by introducing stochastic transitions (e.g.,Du¨rr, Goldstein, Tu-
mulka, and Zanghi 2004). There seem good reasons to think that such stochastic
rules are likely to ensure that any initial hidden-variable state is likely to give
rise to dynamics that produce appropriate probabilities (Bub (1997) provides a
good discussion of this point). If so, the need for an probability condition in
hidden variable theories would be obviated.
In any case, neither stochasticity in hidden-variable dynamics nor proba-
bilistic assumptions about hidden-variable initial states suffices to explain the
time-asymmetry of the macrodynamics of a hidden-variable theory: that time-
asymmetry is encoded in the evolution of the quantum state, which is inde-
pendent of the hidden variables. Hidden-variable theories need to make some
kind of Simplicity assumption about the initial quantum state to recover this
time asymmetry. Indeed, in a hidden variable theory with stochastic dynamics,
there is no a priori reason why the direction of the stochasticity in the emer-
gent macrodynamics need be aligned with the direction in the hidden-variable
dynamics.
Finally, consider the Everett interpretation. Here it is often23 claimed that
probability is a particular difficulty. But other than conceptual unfamiliarity
(which, I can attest, fades with exposure) and intuitions (which we have no
reason to regard as truth-tracking in this context), it is not clear why this
should be. After all, at a technical level the branching structure in unmodified
quantum mechanics has the same structure as in a stochastic dynamical theory:
a collection of histories, and a measure defined upon them with the formal
structure of a probability measure. The only differences are that (i) in the
stochastic case the measure is supposed to be taken as fundamental, whereas in
the quantum case it is derived from underlying features of the theory; (ii) in the
stochastic case the intended interpretation is that only one history is physically
21Every problem is an opportunity: Antony Valentini (see Valentini (1996, 2001, 2010),
Valentini and Westman (2004), and references therein) has extensively explored the possibility
that violation of this constraint could lead to empirically testable deviations from quantum
theory.
22e.g., in Handfield and Wilson’s chapter in this volume.
23For instance, Lewis (2007b) calls probability the “Achilles heel” of the Everett interpre-
tation
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real, whereas in the Everett interpretation, all are (or at any rate, all with a
non-vanishing measure). Intuitively (ii) makes a crucial difference, but I am not
aware of convincing reasons why these intuitions are to be trusted.24
To elaborate: in section 5 I claimed that if a given probability is objective
(is ‘chance’ in Lewis’s terminology), it must be either taken as a primitive or
analysed in terms of some non-probabilistic facts. But if it is acceptable to
identify the measure in a stochastic theory primitively with chance, it is not
obviously less acceptable to identify the measure in quantum theory likewise
with chance.25
And if chance is to be analysed, then that analysis needs to provide both
(a) a formal recovery of a probability measure from non-probabilistic facts,
and (b) an explanation of why that recovered measure is chance. But (a),
though difficult in stochastic theories, is straightforward in quantum theory:
probabilities are identified with the mod-squared-amplitudes of the branches,
which are categorical magnitudes in quantum theory with non-probabilistic roles
to play in the theory’s structure and dynamics. (It should not be surprising
that (a) is simpler: the difficulty in stochastic mechanics is that the probability
measure over a whole space of histories must be recovered from facts about a
single history. In Everett-interpreted quantum theory, both the whole space
and the measure are emergent properties of the physical Universe.)
As for (b), if the Everett interpretation had nothing to offer here it would not
obviously be worse off than in the non-quantum case: in particular, David Pa-
pineau claimed some while ago that the inferential and decision-theoretic links
between chance and action are just as mysterious in nonquantum physics and
I know of no persuasive refutation. But in fact, David Deutsch (1999), Hilary
Greaves and Wayne Myrvold (Greaves 2007a, Greaves and Myrvold 2010) and
myself have claimed that it is possible to derive some or all of these links from
quantum mechanics and from non-question-begging assumptions of decision the-
ory, essentially by exploiting the symmetries of the quantum state (symmetries
that are inevitably broken in non-Everettian physics by the fact that one out-
come rather than another actually happens). If so, it would effectively amount
to a derivation of Lewis’s Principle Principle, and thus of Papineau’s two links.
My own view, then (developed in extenso in chapters 4-6 of Wallace (2012a))
is that far from probability being a weakness of the Everett interpretation, Ev-
erettian quantum mechanics provides new resources to resolve extant problems
in the interpretation of probability. (The literature on the subject is large and
controversial, though; for dissenting views, see Price (2010), Kent (2010), Albert
(2010), Lewis (2005); see also Greaves (2007b) for a general review.)
Whatever the status of probability in the Everett interpretation, though,
the status of the time asymmetry of stochastic processes is reasonably clear:
since the Everett interpretation is a pure interpretation of unmodified quantum
mechanics, its time asymmetry arises from the mechanism discussed in section
24An alternative approach (which lies beyond the scope of this chapter) exploits the pos-
sibility of a connection between the Everettian multiverse and Lewisian modal realism; cf
Wilson (2012).
25This strategy was advocated in the 1990s by Simon Saunders (Saunders 1995, 1996, 1998).
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9: non-probabilistic constraints on the initial quantum state.
11 Conclusion
In pre-quantum physics, probability enters either through stochastic mechan-
ics, in which a deterministic evolution equation is replaced by a probabilistic
one, or through statistical mechanics, where a probability distribution is placed
over states of a classical system with many degrees of freedom. Both moves
lead to stochastic dynamics for macrostate of the system, which is by its nature
time-asymmetric. In the former case the origin of the asymmetry is the fun-
damental time asymmetry of the underlying stochastic mechanics; in the latter
case, it arises from a particular probabilistic constraint on the system’s initial
state. In this second case, however, the detailed form of the macrodynamics
are independent of the particular initial-state probabilities, provided only that
this constraint is satisfied. In both cases, there are significant conceptual and
philosophical problems in making sense of the notion of probability that is being
used.
In quantum theory, the statistical move plays no particular role: the results
of quantum statistical mechanics arise from the quantum dynamics of individual
states and do not depend on any additional probabilistic postulate. As a conse-
quence, debates about the nature of classical statistical-mechanical probability
are not of direct relevance to our understanding of the actual world as described
by contemporary physics. Probability in contemporary physics arises from the
probabilistic nature of quantum theory itself, not from any additional posit.
That ‘probabilistic nature’ depends on how the quantum measurement prob-
lem is resolved. According to dynamical-collapse theories, it is a fundamental
stochasticity, analogous to pre-quantum stochastic mechanics. According to
(deterministic) hidden-variable theories, it is a consequence of a probability
distribution over the hidden variables, analogous to pre-quantum statistical me-
chanics. According to the Everett interpretation, it is something new, not analo-
gous to either; it is controversial whether this means that Everettian probability
is more or less well understood than pre-quantum probability.
The direction of time in the probabilistic macrodynamics of quantum theory
is also dependent on the resolution of the measurement problem. In dynamical
collapse theories, it is a consequence of the fundamental time-asymmetry of the
dynamics. In the Everett interpretation, and in hidden-variable theories, it is a
consequence of a non-probabilistic constraint on the initial quantum state.
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